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Abstract 
 
Policy reform around the globe has increased the autonomy that schools 
enjoy in spending on resources. This reform assumes that schools face strong 
incentives to use their resources to maximise pupil attainment and that they 
know best how to spend their money to achieve this aim. This study provides 
evidence of the relationship between governance and how schools choose to 
spend their money. It uses data for all state funded secondary schools in 
2009/10, 2011/12 and 2015/2016. This enables a comparison of schools 
operating under three forms of governance: maintained by a local municipal 
authority (LMAs); as a single ‘academy’ trust outside local authority control 
(SATs); or in a network of academy schools governed by a multi-academy 
trust (MATs). The data provide no support for claims that academy schools 
will spend less on administration or that networks of schools will enjoy 
economies of scale. The data do show that academy schools spent 
proportionately less on teacher salaries and educational support, and more on 
back office costs, after taking account of pupil characteristics.  
Keywords 
Academies; economies of scale; school bureaucracy; governance; school costs 
 
Introduction 
In recent decades global reforms have encouraged school-based management of educational 
resources (De Grauwe, 2005). These reforms have been partly justified by beliefs that (i) local 
schools will have a greater incentive than government officials to use resources efficiently; and 
(ii) that local schools will have more powerful knowledge about what will be effective in their 
local context. Research in many countries (e.g. Carney et al., 2007; Davies et al., 2016; Kimber 
et al, 2011; Moradi et al., 2012) has suggested a range of unintended effects of these reforms, 
questioning the extent to which the expectations of policymakers are being met in practice. 
These questions appear to have had little impact on the direction of policy.  
 
This study focuses on reforms in England where policy has driven school-based management 
into territory that lies beyond what has been explored in many countries. We focus on variation 
in patterns of spending in secondary schools according to the scope of school-based 
management afforded by the governance they experience. This comparison divides secondary 
schools in England into three main groups: Local authority maintained (LAMs), single 
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academy trusts (SATs) and multi-academy-trusts (MATs). LAMs experience hierarchical 
governance through municipal authorities, but the vast majority of the school budget (86%) is 
devolved to schools. SATs are free from municipal control and their spending is directed by 
their own board of governors. Higham and Earley (2013: 13) summarised the results of a survey 
of school leaders as showing that “academy status, in particular, was seen to create additional 
spheres for schools to manage, including financial and site management, pay and conditions 
and the procurement of services and support”. Schools belonging to MATs are governed 
collectively by a trust board and each school has its budget ‘top-sliced’ to pay for the operation 
of the network. 
 
By 2015/16i 65% of English state-funded secondary schools were ‘academies’ and, of these, 
47% belonged to a MAT in which the leadership and administration was at least partially shared 
in common across the schoolsii. The consequences of policies on school autonomy in general, 
and ‘academisation’ in particular, have been largely examined either in terms of how the system 
operates (e.g. Ehren & Perryman, 2018; Eyles & Machin, 2015; Leithwood & Menzies, 1998; 
Maslowski, Scheerens  & Luyten, 2007) or in terms of impact on pupil attainment (e.g. NFER, 
2015). However, arguments for these policy shifts have made substantial claims about the 
benefits of school autonomy and school partnerships for cost efficiency. We have been told 
that single autonomous schools will be more efficient than local bureaucracies in making 
resources choices (e.g. Gove, 2011). We have been told that multi-academy trusts will secure 
cost advantages through economies of scale (Hill et al., 2016) and that these advantages will 
get bigger as the number of schools in each trust increases (Carter, 2016). But there has been 
comparatively little analysis of data on school budgets which can tell us something about 
associations between school governance and resource decisionsiii. Existing analysis in the 
public domain has tended to focus on evidence of what school leaders say they do. For example, 
the majority of academies surveyed by Cirin (2014) reported that they had used independence 
from local government to change suppliers. 
 
This study aims to address the gap in the analysis of evidence about what schools actually do 
with their money. Fairly detailed data on state funded schools in England have been made 
available by the Department for Education. These data show how each school divided its 
spending between different categories (including teacher salaries, educational support and 
‘back office’). This study examines these data to see if the claims for the efficiency of single 
academies and multi-academy trusts in England are supported by data from school budgets.  
 
Autonomy, chains and resources: predictions in the literature 
Autonomy 
Advocacy of school autonomy (e.g. Caldwell, 2005) has relied heavily on beliefs about the 
way in which schools will use autonomy to achieve cost efficiencies that will enable them to 
allocate more spending to resources that will make a difference to pupils’ attainment.  For 
example, they might make more discerning choices between local suppliers to reduce 
expenditure on premises. They might be freed from ‘red tape’ allowing them to reduce ‘back 
office’ costs. They might spend more on teachers, given that the majority of ‘school effects’ 
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on pupil attainment are attributable to teachers (Davies, 2018; Slater, Davies & Burgess, 2012). 
One strand of the argument (e.g. Caldwell, 2005) assumes that schools will be intrinsically 
motivated to use their autonomy in the public interest. Another strand (e.g. Hanushek,  Link  & 
Woessmann, 2013) assumes that schools will be self-interested and will only act in the public 
interest if they are constrained to do so by competition from other schools. Studies of charter 
schools in the US have yielded little support for expectations that schools will use autonomy 
to increase cost effectiveness. Arsen (2000) found that charter schools in one US state spent a 
higher proportion on administration than schools under local district control. Baker, Libby & 
Wiley (2012) reported that charter schools in three US states spent substantially more per pupil 
than schools under the control of local districts. This study offers a similar comparison for 
schools in England.  
 
Networks 
Networks of schools have developed in several countries where policy has encouraged school 
autonomy. Between 2000 and 2008 roughly a third of primary children enrolled in private 
(voucher) schools in Chile attended a Franchise school belonging to a chain (Elacqua et al., 
2011). By 2008, the for-profit organisation Edison Schools was running more than 250 US 
schools (Marsh, Hamilton & Gill, 2008). School networks in England have taken a variety of 
forms (Salokangas & Chapman, 2014; Simkins, 2015). If they are loosely coupled networks 
(Bauman, 2001) then individual schools may retain substantial autonomy. Schools in England 
that have become partners in ‘Teaching School Alliances’ (TSAs) specifically to provide initial 
and continuing teacher education largely fall within this category. Some Local Authorities have 
also supported the development of loose-knit school networksiv. In contrast, schools belonging 
to a ‘multi-academy trust’ (MAT) share a governance structure which makes them more likely 
to be ‘tight-knit’ (Bauman, 2001) or ‘hard federations’ (Chapman & Muijs, 2014). Although 
there is considerable variation between MATs (Cirin, 2017), schools in MATs will usually 
have less freedom than SATs over resources. Indeed, some may have less individual resource 
autonomy than local authority maintained  schools (West & Wolfe, 2018). 
 
Although policy in England is encouraging schools to join MATs (DfE, 2016), from the 
perspective of the ‘local school management’ argument, MATs appear to be a backward step. 
The size of this problem depends on the scale of network bureaucracy and the extent to which 
it reduces competitive pressure on schools. Evidence summarised by West & Wolfe (2018) 
suggests that some school network managers have enjoyed scope to increase their own benefits.  
However, the necessary market incentives depend on the possibility of competition, not simply 
the existence of competition. As long as a market is ‘contestable’ a school network has reason 
to fear that if it slips into inefficiency it will lose its market share (Baumol, Panzar & Willig, 
1982). However, school networks which combine secondary schools with their ‘feeder’ 
primary schools (vertical integration) and schools which are able to shield themselves from 
competition through their network’s local market share look like backward steps from a school 
autonomy perspective.  
 
4 
 
Even so, threats to efficiency from school chains’ market power may be more than offset by 
economies of scale. A substantial body of evidence suggests that there are significant 
economies of scale when local authority schools are organised in larger groupings. Comparison 
of the total spending of local authorities in England (which vary greatly in size) has suggested 
substantive economies of scale for larger authorities (Andrews & Byrne, 2009). Several studies 
have investigated the relationship between the size of US school districts (in terms of number 
of pupils or schools) and costs per pupil. These studies (e.g. Chakraborty, Biswas & Lewis, 
2000; Duncombe, Miner & Ruggiero, 1995; Duncombe & Yinger, 2007) consistently report 
economies of scale. Studies (such as Chakraborty, Biswas & Lewis, 2000) which examine 
school and district costs find economies of scale at both levels. 
 
Therefore, there appears to be some basis for optimism that collaboration between schools in 
the form of multi-academy trusts will reduce administrative costs for individual schools. This 
expectation was confidently expressed in a government commissioned report (Hill et al., 2012) 
soon after the multi-academy policy was initiated. It was shared by school leaders’ whose views 
were reported in case study research by Woods et al. (2013). A similar impression is given by 
the results of a survey carried out by Cirin (2017). The proportion of schools in MATs claiming 
financial efficiencies in spending on ICT, Energy, Printing and Payroll was between 4 and 8 
percentage points higher than the proportion of SATs reporting efficiencies in these areas of 
spending (Cirin, 2017). However, even in these instances the proportion of MAT schools 
reporting these efficiencies was only between 12 and 27%.  
 
 
Method 
 
We conducted two descriptive comparisons of school finance data in England. First, we 
compared the pattern of spending in local authority maintained schools and the pattern of 
spending in academy schools. We use this comparison to comment on two questions that are 
raised by our review of policy debate and previous research: (i) do academy schools manage 
their resources more effectively than local authority schools enabling them to spend more on 
teaching that will directly benefit pupils? And (ii) do local authority maintained schools show 
greater concern for the public good through the extent of their spending on special educational 
needs? Next, we compared spending patterns for single academy schools with spending 
patterns for schools belonging to multi-academy trusts. We use this comparison to comment 
on a third question: (iii) do groups of schools benefit from economies of scale by sharing ‘back 
office’ costs? Each comparison starts with a cross-sectional analysis of data from 2015/16. 
Although we are able to control for a range of school characteristics, a cross-sectional analysis 
cannot detect selection bias resulting from unobserved differences between schools that chose 
to become academies or chose to join a MAT and other schools. In order to check on the 
inferences from the cross-sectional comparisons we also conducted comparisons over time. We 
compare the spending patterns of academy schools in 2015/16 with the spending patterns of 
the same schools when they were not academies in 2009/10. We also compare spending 
patterns of schools belonging to MATs in 2015/16 which were SATs in 2011/12.  
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Study 1 Comparison of spending by local authority maintained and academy schools 
 
The cross-sectional analysis examined factors associated with the proportion of school 
spending on each of eight categories of spending reported in national data (teachers’ salaries, 
supply teachers, educational support, back office, premises, other staff, learning resources 
including IT and capital financing). The analysis was conducted through linear regressions 
which controlled for a range of factors either included in the calculation of government per 
school funding or related to it (Equation 1).  
 
ܺ௖௜ 	ൌ 	 βଵ ௜ܵ ൅ 	ߚଶ ௜ܲ ൅	ߚଷܮ௜ ൅	ߚସ ௜ܶ ൅	ߚହܩ௜௜   (Equation 1) 
 
Where: 
 ܺ௖௜ refers to the spending of schooli  (c = 1…8 categories of spending). 
௜ܵ refers to the full-time equivalent measure of the number of pupils enrolled at the school; 
௜ܲ is a vector of pupil cohort characteristics (% eligible for free school meals, % of pupils with 
English as their second language, % of pupils with a statement of special educational needs or 
an Education, Health and Care (EHC) plan, % of pupils receiving support for educational 
special needs but without a statement or EHC); 
ܮ௜ is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the school is in London; 
௜ܶ is a vector of school types (faith school or not and dummies for offering schooling for 
primary age pupils and for pupils aged 16-18). Government funding per pupil for these age 
groups was different from per pupil funding for pupils aged 11-16. 
ܩ௜ is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for academy schools 
 
The study uses national data for 2015/16 when local authority (LA) governed (35%), single 
academy schools (34%) and multi-academy trusts (MATs) (31%) each accounted for a 
substantial proportion of all secondary schools in England. Any comparison of spending by 
academy schools and local authority schools needs to be interpreted in the context of the 
proportion of school funding for LA schools that was retained by local authorities. Local 
authorities were responsible for distributing the budget to all schools. They retained a 
proportion of this budget to cover costs for which they were responsible. These fell into two 
categories: items that related to local authority responsibilities for all schools (including 
academies) and items that related to local authority responsibilities for LA schools only. In 
2015/16 local authorities allocated just over 86% of their budget for secondary schools in the 
form of delegated individual school budgets (ISBs). These ISBs included provision for 
overheads in maintained schools meaning that it should be fair to compare maintained and 
academy schools’ reporting of back office costs on the basis of school-level financial 
statements. The budget retained by LAs was used in four different ways. The first two 
categories applied to all schools (whether LA maintained or not) funding administration of the 
schools system (e.g. school admissions) and redistributing funds to meet high-needs (such as 
low-income families and special educational needs and free admission to libraries). The third 
involved providing funds for non-maintained schools (academies and independent schools). 
The final category, ‘other grants’ applied to maintained secondary schools but not to non-
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maintained schools. This final category accounted for 0.5% of LAs’ secondary school budget 
(DfE, 2016)v.  However, the reporting of spending by MAT schools also has to be treated with 
care. In their spending accounts, MAT schools were asked to report their contribution to their 
parent trust in a separate line that was not included in the categories used to present school-
level funding (with a notable lack of transparency in the use of public funds). We address this 
gap by relying Cirin (2017) who reported on the basis of survey evidence, that the average top-
slice of MAT schools by MAT trusts was about 5%. 
 
The data set comprised all the 3157 state funded schools that provided education for at least 
the age range 14-16. Six schools were excluded from the analysis because the reported 
spending for these schools appeared strange (negative or zero spending on teachers’ salaries). 
Descriptive data are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics for spending per pupil in state funded secondary schools 
2015-16 
 Mean Standard 
deviation 
n 
Continuous variables (dependent)    
% spent on teaching staff 53.3 7.3 3153 
% spent on supply teachers 2.2 2.0 3153 
% spent on educational support 9.8 3.9 3153 
% spent on premises 6.5 3.4 3153 
% spent on back office 10.9 5.0 3153 
% spent on catering 2.7 2.8 3153 
% spent on other staff 2.3 2.3 3153 
% spent on energy 1.6 0.8 3153 
% spent on learning resources 4.3 2.9 3153 
% spent on ICT 1.0 1.0 3153 
% spent on consultancy 1.9 2.3 3153 
% other spending 4.5 4.7 3153 
    
Continuous variable (control variables)    
Number of pupils enrolled (FTE) 970 407 3151 
% capacity used 83.0 20.1 3151 
% of pupils eligible for Free school meals (FSM) 15.7 11.2 3035 
% English 2nd language 15.2 20.1 3035 
% pupils statement or EHC 1.9 1.4 2857 
% pupils SEN supported 11.7 7.0 3025 
    
Dummy variables  %  
% of schools in London  15 3151 
% of secondary schools also providing some primary education  5 3151 
% of secondary schools providing education for 16-18 year-
olds 
 68 3151 
% of faith schools  19 3151 
% of academy schools  65 3151 
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We checked on the risk of selection bias in the cross-sectional comparison by comparing the 
distribution of spending by 1297 secondary schools that were academies in 2015/16 but which 
had been local authority-maintained schools in 2009/10. The academic year 2015/16 was the 
most recent for which data on academy school spending has been published and the base year 
of 2009/10 meant that we included all schools that had converted to academy status during the 
expansion of the academy school system under the post-2010 governments. Of course, this 
excludes academies that were newly established during this period. We only included schools 
that reported GCSE entries for 2015/16 (excluding sixth form colleges and middle schools). 
We also compared the comparison of financial data with the Department for Education school 
level data on the school workforce. 
Study 2 
Model 
The implications for school spending of joining a multi-academy trust may be observed through 
a comparison of single academies which maintained that status and single academies that 
subsequently joined a multi-academy trust. The question addressed by this model is how single 
or multi-academy trust status affected the distribution of school spending. 
Data 
 
Secondary school spending data were taken from Excel spreadsheets of school level data for 
academy school spending in the years 2009/10, 2011/12 and 2015/16 provided by the 
Department for Education (DfE). These data were matched with other data sets providing 
school and pupil characteristics. The data for 2015/16 were the most recent publicly available 
when this paper was being prepared. These tables also included information on the number of 
students in the school (roll), proportion of students eligible for free schools and public 
examination results. These data were combined with data on school capacity taken from other 
DfE tables. Reporting of financial data from schools and local authorities in England needs to 
be treated with some caution and cases were excluded either if the per pupil data in the original 
table appeared doubtful (e.g. allocation to categories not summing to roughly 100%, spending 
on teacher salaries of less than 30%, negative spending in any category). 
 
Results (1) a comparison of the spending patterns of local authority maintained schools 
and academy schools in 2015/16 
 
The cross-sectional analysis enables a comparison of the proportion spent on each of teacher 
salaries, supply teachers, educational support, back office, premises, other staff, learning 
resources and capital financing by LA and academy schools. Of course, these data tell us 
nothing about the relative efficiency between LA and academy schools of each pound spent on 
back office. However, the arguments deployed for the benefits of school autonomy, suggest 
that academy schools would choose to spend less in categories not directly related to pupil 
attainment and more on resources that do. At the time that data were collected, research was 
suggesting that schools should spend less on buildings and administration (Woolner et al., 
2007), less on educational support through teaching assistants (Blatchford, et al., 2012; Gerber 
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et al., 2001) and more on teacher salaries (Figlio, 1997; Slater et al., 2012). Table 2 provides a 
simple comparison of the proportion spent by LA schools and academies in each of these 
categories. Each of these differences was statistically significant (p <.01). 
 
Table 2 Proportion of spending on back office, premises and capital financing: local 
authority and academy schools in England 2015/2016 
 
% of total spending on 
Local authority 
controlled schools 
Academy 
schools 
Teachers 54.1 52.8 
Educational support 10.6 9.4 
Back Office  10.0 11.3 
Premises  6.8 6.4 
Other 4.3 4.6 
n 1093 2060 
 
We also compared school workforce data for local authority maintained and academy schools 
in 2015/16. There was no significant difference in pupil-teacher ratio, but average teacher 
salary was 2.6% higher in local authority-maintained schools. At first, this looks surprising 
given that the proportion of teachers in leadership roles (presumably on higher salary scales) 
was 12% higher in academy schools. It seems probable that the higher salaries in LAMs 
reflected the age profile of staff. LAMs employed just over 5% more staff aged over 50 
compared to academy schools. These data suggest that academy schools were more likely to 
be tring to attract new younger staff by offering posts of responsibility (and career prospects) 
whilst still keeping their overall salary below lower than LAMS.  The proportion of staff other 
than teachers per pupil was 18% higher in academies.  Given the comparison of spending on 
educational support in Table 2 and the difference between LAMs’ and academies’ spending on 
catering it appears likely that this difference was due to academies’ spending on auxiliary staff 
who did not directly support teaching.   
 
However, it is possible that these differences are biased by differences between the 
characteristics of pupils educated in LA and academy schools or differences in the 
representation of different school types (such as primary and 16-18 provision). Therefore, 
regression analyses were undertaken to control for these factors and the results are presented 
in Tables 3A and 3B. We do not present results for spending on other staff, energy, learning 
resources and ‘other’ as there was little discernible association between academy status and the 
proportion of spending devoted to each of these categories. The proportion of the total variance 
accounted for by the independent variables is mostly small, ranging from .03 to .53 with a mean 
of .16, but the size of the coefficient on ‘academy status’ does stand out in several spending 
categories. When interpreting these associations it is important to remember that there is also 
a large variation between academies. 
 
Academy schools devoted higher proportions of their spending to back office and catering and 
lower proportions to teacher salaries, educational support and educational consultancy. Tables 
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3A and 3B show that the differences presented in Table 2 are more or less unaffected by the 
inclusion of controls for pupil and school characteristics.  
 
Table 3A Factors associated with the proportion (%) of school spending on teachers, 
supply teachers, educational support and back office 
 
 Teachers Supply Support Back Office 
 B (p) B (p) B (p) B (p) 
(Constant) 50.2 (<.001) 3.2 (<.001) 8.4 (<.001) 13.2 (<.001) 
Number of pupils/100 .10 (.03) .001 (.93) .06 (.01) -.08 (.01) 
% capacity utilised .07 (<.001) -.014 (<.001) -.002 (.62) -.03 (<.001) 
% eligible for FSM -.13 (<.001) .017 (<.001) .067 (<.001) .01 (.26) 
% English 2nd language -.03 (<.001) .010 (<.001) -.004 (.39) .02 (.003) 
% pupils statement/EHC -.43 (<.001) -.036 (.17) .629 (<.001) -.01 (.91) 
% pupils SEN supported -.01 (.53) .008 (.17) .018 (.08) .02 (.19) 
London or not 1.59 (<.001) .230 (.05) -1.027 (<.001) -.61 (.04) 
Faith school .64 (.05) .009 (.92) -.550 (.001) -.13 (.58) 
Provides primary -.34 (.56) .264 (.12) 1.062 (.001) -.67 (.11) 
Provides 16-18 1.31 (<.001) -.134 (.12) -.641 (<.001) -.56 (.01) 
Academy -1.66 (<.001) -.251 (.001) -.953 (<.001) 1.290 (<.001) 
R2 .16 .08 .15 .06 
n 2844 2844 2844 2844 
     
Source: Department for Education school level data for 2015/16 
 
Table 3B Factors associated with the proportion of school spending on premises, other 
staff, learning resources and capital financing 
 
 Premises Catering ICT Educational Consultancy 
 B (p) B (p) B (p) B (p) 
(Constant) 8.91 (<.001) .70 (.02) 1.442 (<.001) 3.78 (<.001) 
FTE -.01 (.80) -.02 (.20) .01 .119 -.03 (.011) 
% capacity utilised -.02 (.001) .01 (.08) .001 .458 .004 (.05) 
% eligible for FSM -.001 (.84) .01 (.08) -.002 .311 .02 (<.001) 
% English 2nd language -.01 (.09) .01 (.03) .003 .010 .00 (.97) 
% pupils statement/EHC -.07 (.11) -.05 (.11) .00 .988 -.03 (.23) 
% pupils SEN supported -.03 (.002) -.01 (.49) -.004 .221 .00 (.95) 
London or not .87 (<.001) -.07 (.65) -.003 .959 -.11 (.26) 
Faith school .36 (.023) .25 (.04) .010 .845 .06 (.48) 
Provides primary -.60 (.04) .60 (.01) .047 .607 -.11 (.42) 
Provides 16-18 -.73 (<.001) -.20 (.07) -.040 .387 .19 (.01) 
Academy -.26 (.05) 2.56 (<.001) -.534 (<.001) -3.46 (<.001) 
R2 .03 .21 .07 .53 
n 2844 2844 2844 2844 
Source: Department for Education school level data for 2015/16 
 
 
10 
 
To check on the results in Tables 2-3 we compared the 2009/10 and 2015/16 spending patterns 
of schools that had switched from Local Authority control to academy status during this period. 
This comparison using simple paired-sample t-tests is shown in Table 4.  This table shows 
broadly similar patterns to Tables 2-3. Local Authority controlled schools that became 
academies reduced the percentage per pupil they spent on teaching staff, educational support, 
learning resources and educational consultancy. However, these reductions are smaller than the 
differences between academies and LA maintained schools in Tables 2-3. The schools that 
became academies increased the proportion of their spending on catering, supply teachers and 
back office. The newly created academies also increased the proportion of their ‘self-generated’ 
income from an average of 4.5% in 2009/10 to 6.2% in 2015/16 but we did not detect clear 
associations between this change and the pattern of school spending.  
 
Table 4 The change between 2009 and 2015 in the proportion per pupil spent on each 
category of spending (secondary schools which were academies in 2015 but not in 2009, 
n=1297) 
% per pupil spent on 2009 2015 
2015-2009 
difference  
(p) 
 Mean s.d. Mean s.d.  
Salaried teaching staff 57.9 5.1 54.6 6.7 <.001 
Supply teachers 1.6 1.1 1.8 1.8 <.001 
Educational support 9.3 2.9 8.9 3.8 <.001 
Premises 6.3 2.5 6.4 3.3 .23 
Back office 8.9 3.0 10.6 3.8 <.001 
Catering 0.9 0.8 3.5 3.2 <.001 
Other staff 1.8 1.4 2.3 2.7 <.001 
Energy 1.7 0.6 1.4 0.6 <.001 
Learning resources 4.9 2.2 4.5 3.5 <.001 
ICT 1.5 1.0 0.8 0.8 <.001 
Educational consultancy 1.1 1.2 0.6 1.0 <.001 
Other 4.2 2.4 4.5 3.5 .01 
Sources: Department for Education school level data for 2009/10 and 2015/16 
 
Results (2) a comparison of spending patterns in single academies and schools in multi-
academy trusts 
 
We begin a comparison of SATs and MATs with a cross-sectional analysis of data for 2015/16. 
In this academic year MATs employed a higher ratio of TAs to teachers (22% higher) and a 
higher ratio of teachers in leadership positions to classroom teachers (21%). MATs also 
employed more auxiliary staff per pupil (7%). SATs employed 22% more teachers over 50. So 
it is unsurprising that a simple comparison of spending categories suggests a lot of differences 
between SATs and MATs.  
 
Table 5 takes account of other factors that may affect the proportion that a school spends on 
each category. The table only reports on spending categories where the analysis suggested an 
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association with being a SAT or MAT. There was no evidence of a meaningful difference 
between SATs and MATs in spending on teachers or back office.  
 
Table 5 Factors associated with the proportion of school spending on educational support, 
premises, energy and learning resources in SATs and MATs in 2015/16 (n=1790) 
 
 Educational support 
Premises Energy Learning 
resources 
 B (p) B (p) B (p) B (p) 
(Constant) 6.80 (<.001) 8.79 (<.001) 2.51 (<.001) 4.19 (<.001) 
FTE .03 (.41) -.02 (.51) -.01 (.10) -.01 (.81) 
% capacity utilised .005 (.44) -.01 (.02) -.01 (<.001) .004 (.46) 
% eligible for FSM .08 (<.001) -.01 (.33) .003 (.12) .004 (.63) 
% English 2nd language -.01 (.15) -.01 (.16) -.003 (.02) -.002 (.76) 
% pupils statement/EHC .58 (<.001) -.05 (.43) -.05 (<.001) -.05 (.43) 
% pupils SEN supported .01 (.41) -.04 (.001) -.002 (.47) -.01 (.32) 
London or not -1.05 (.001) 1.29 (<.001) -.01 (.93) -.27 (.30) 
Faith school -.43 (.09) .34 (.11) .16 (.001) .09 (.67) 
Provides primary .93 (.02) -.68 (.04) .02 (.79) -.28 (.40) 
Provides 16-18 -.45 (.05) -.57 (.004) -.02 (.63) .45 (.02) 
MAT .47 (.01) -.34 (.04) .07 (.05) -.44 (.006) 
R2 .12 .04 .10 .01 
 
The associations reported in Table 5 suggested only minor differences between the spending 
patterns of SATs and MATs. We found no differences between schools that were the only 
secondary school in their MAT and other MAT schools. We also found no differences between 
schools that belonged to MATs which only included schools in adjacent postcode areas and 
other MAT schools.  
 
We also analysed change in the spending patterns (2011/12 to 2015/16) of schools that were 
single academy schools in 2011/12. This analysis excludes schools that were established by 
academy trusts (and which therefore never existed as ‘single academy schools’). A quarter of 
the 801 single academy schools in 2011/12 had joined multi-academy trusts by 2015/16 (Table 
6). 
 
Table 6 Governance status in 2015/16 of schools that were academies in 2011/12 
 n %
Single academy trust (SAT) 577 72.0
Multi-academy trust (MAT) 201 25.1
No record in 2015/16 23 2.9
 801
 
The proportion of spending on back office rose over the period in schools that remained single 
academies and in single academies that joined MATs. The increase was smaller in schools that 
joined MATs. Schools that remained as single academies reduced their spending on educational 
consultancy more than schools that joined MATs. The increase in spending on catering was 
much greater in schools that joined MATs. 
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Differences between the cross-sectional analysis and results in Table 7 may have arisen from 
the exclusion of new academy schools from the longitudinal analysis in Table 7. We divided 
MATs in two types (Table 8). MATs were labelled ‘local Trusts’ if they only included 
schools in one or neighbouring local authorities. Other MATs were labelled ‘Chains’ since 
they included schools that were not local partners. The average number of secondary schools 
in a MAT was 6. However, two thirds of MAT schools belonged to a MAT in which there 
were 4 secondary schools or less and 34% of MAT schools belonging to a trust in which they 
were the only secondary school. Table 8 shows that schools in local Trusts were much more 
likely to have converted to academy status from being a Local Authority Maintained School. 
Therefore, schools in local Trusts were more likely than schools in Chains to be included in 
the analysis in Table 7. However, once we took account of our control variables the only 
observable difference between schools in chains and schools in local MATs was that schools 
in chains spent a slightly higher proportion on learning resources.  
 
Table 7 Change in percentage spending between 2011/12 and 2015/16 for schools that 
remained as single academies and schools that joined multi-academy trusts 
 
% per pupil spent on 
SAT in  
2015 /2016 
In MAT in 
2015/16 
p Effect size 
(Cohen’s d) 
Salaried teaching staff -.07 -.18 .84 0.01 
Supply teachers .63 .35 .09 0.18 
Educational support .18 -.64 .01 0.19 
Premises -.48 -1.02 .09 0.18 
Back office 2.09 1.40 .06 0.19 
Catering .20 2.73 <.001 1.43 
Other staff -.07 .07 .60 0.05 
Energy -.08 -.07 .66 0.02 
Learning resources -.26 -.23 .91 0.01 
ICT -.49 -.60 .29 0.11 
Educational consultancy -.67 -.24 <.001 0.44 
Other -1.61 -1.64 .93 0.01 
 
Table 8 Types of school in local MATs and Chain MATs in 2015/16 
 
 MAT is a 
local Trust 
MAT is a 
Chain 
Total 
Academy led by sponsor 179 264 443 
Academy Converter 361 95 456 
Free School 19 33 52 
Free Studio School 24 4 28 
Free School (University Technical College) 4 1 5 
Average number of schools in MAT 2 12  
Number of Schools 586 397 984 
 
Therefore, our analysis of school-level spending data found little indication that MAT 
schools gained a substantial cost advantage over SAT schools through being able to share the 
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administrative burden through their academy trust. We did find that schools that joined 
MATs between 2011 and 2015 increased their spending on back office by a smaller 
percentage compared to schools that remained as SATs. However, this was insufficient to be 
observable in our cross-sectional analysis of all SATs and MATs in 2015/16. Moreover, the 
most reasonable interpretation of the MAT school level data is that it excludes the top-slice to 
academy trusts. Some of this top-slice will have been used to fund classroom support and 
teacher development. However, it seems unlikely that the proportion of the top-slice going to 
fund back office and managerial administration was less than the proportion of these items in 
school-level budgets.  
 
 
Discussion 
Our main concern has been to examine assertions about the cost advantages of academy 
secondary schools. In so doing we have taken account of the top-slicing by LAs of the budgets 
for the schools they maintain and the top-slicing by academy trusts of the schools in MATs. 
The average level and the use of funds of LA top-slicing is publicly reported. The average level 
of top-slicing by MATs has been estimated by survey returns (Cirin, 2017). The average use 
by academy trusts of their top-slice is not publicly reported and company reports lodged by 
academy trusts (unlike the accounts provided to the Charities Commissions by most private 
schools – including private school chains) do not provide this information.  
 
We found that after controlling for other factors, academy schools spent a higher proportion of 
their budgets on back office and a lower proportion on teachers’ salaries. Moreover, schools 
that became academies between 2009/10 and 2015/16 increased the proportion they spent on 
back office. The effect size (Cohen’s d) for this increase was 0.5. The size of this increase is 
more than the funding retained by LAs for the sole benefit of maintained schools, although the 
actual LA subsidy may be under-estimated by reported figures. Nonetheless, it is very difficult 
to find any support in reported spending patterns for the assertion (e.g. Gove, 2011) that 
academy schools will be more cost efficient than maintained schools. One possible explanation 
is that secondary schools in England had already exhausted the scope for cost improvements 
whilst using their devolved budgets when still maintained by local authorities. If this 
explanation were to stand the results would not present a challenge to the expectations of those 
(e.g. Caldwell, 2005; Hanushek, Link & Woessman, 2013) who have asserted that school 
autonomy will necessarily mean greater cost efficiency. However, given reports from the 
analysis of autonomous schools in the US (Arsen, 2000; Bake, Libby & Wiley, 2012), the 
claims for the necessary cost-efficiency of autonomous schools may bear further scrutiny.  
 
A government funded report (Hill et al., 2012, 10) also asserted that the growth of school chains 
was driven in part by a search for “a cost-effective operating model with enough academies 
contributing to the funding of the central support functions of the chain.” The same study 
concluded that academy chains did benefit from economies of scale. Another government 
funded report (Cirin, 2017) claimed that survey results showed that school leaders in MATs 
believed they were now enjoying economies of scale through belonging to a school network. 
However, neither our cross-sectional nor longitudinal analyses found evidence to support these 
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claims. These analyses compared SATs and MATs and the data for MATs excluded the top-
slice taken by the MAT trust. The comparisons found no evidence to support claims of 
economies of scale. It seems unlikely that the proportion of the top-slice allocated to back office 
was lower or that the proportion allocated to classroom teachers was higher than the 
proportions of spending on these categories in individual schools. Of course, patterns of 
spending do vary between MATs and it seems plausible that some MATs have been successful 
in securing economies of scale. But on average, there is insufficient evidence to back the claim. 
Government funded reports on the development of MATs made sparse reference to the costs 
of organising networks (Davies, 2018). It seems possible that predictable challenges were kept 
out of focus.  
 
The data also suggest there may be some cause for concern over the consequences of academy 
status for school spending on inclusion. The availability of school budget data provides good 
opportunities for reviewing the impact of policies that affect resource decision making and the 
consequences for efficiency and fairness for children. Of course, these data only provide broad 
brush pictures, but they do indicate useful directions for more fine-grained enquiry. England 
has put itself in the forefront of devolving resource decisions to schools and encouraging the 
growth of school chains (or MATs). The evaluation of this policy matters not just in England, 
but also for other countries considering this path for school policy.  
 
One possible interpretation of these data is not very encouraging. The shift of control of 
resource decisions from local authorities to ‘self-managing’ or single autonomous schools 
involved some loss of economies of scale and was accompanied by a reduction in spending on 
educational support. The latter may reflect better decision-making with local knowledge and 
the incentives that resource control entails. It might also reflect a weakening of concern for 
outcomes (e.g. in relation to inclusion) which are not rewarded by headline indicators in local 
markets. It was plausible to imagine that when autonomous schools joined together in networks 
that they would gain some benefits from economies of scale. However, the headline spending 
figures suggest that networks may not yet be large enough to secure these economies of scale 
whilst incurring additional back office costs in ‘network management’. Perhaps, more 
worrying, schools in MATs spend even less than single academies on educational support. 
Since this result from our cross-sectional analysis is not replicated in data for MAT schools 
that changed their status from being a SAT in 2009 suggests that the problem is concentrated 
in new schools established by MATs. Does this mean even greater efficiency or greater neglect 
of the social good beyond the immediate interest of the school as an organisation? We need 
stronger research evidence to begin to answer these questions.  
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Notes 
i This study uses 2015/16 data which is the most recent year for which financial data are 
available for each type of state-funded secondary school. 
ii See Hill et al. (2012) and Chapman (2015) for detailed descriptions of policy and practice in 
academy school chains in England.  
iii Belfield & Sibieta provided a detailed analysis of long-term changes in total and average 
school spending, but they did not offer direct comparison of the distribution of spending by 
academies and other schools.  
iv Such as the Birmingham Education Partnership (See https://bep.education/) 
v Uncertainties and ambiguities in the way that Las report their spending data mean that this 
figure should be treated with some caution. It may underestimate the additional support that 
LAs provide to maintained school. But it is not possible to discern how this support affects the 
way that schools allocate spending between alternative categories. 
                                                 
